Earlier this week, we released SecureDrop Workstation 1.9.1 to address a high-severity security issue in the USB auto-attach code. This advisory explains the vulnerability, as well as actions administrators should take in response. We are not aware of any exploits.
Technical details
SecureDrop Workstation uses Qubes OS to isolate USB and other devices to a sys-usb qube. When a journalist plugs in a USB storage device, we automatically attach it to the sd-devices qube for exporting documents, or if they plug in a printer, it is attached to sd-printers.
This auto-attach logic had a flaw in the RPC permissions policy, which allowed for a compromised sd-devices or sd-printers qube to gain access to any connected device, such as a webcam, Bluetooth adapter, etc. An attacker would first need to gain code execution inside the qube before being able to exploit this.
The sd-devices and sd-printers qubes are configured to be offline, disposable qubes, which limits an attacker’s ability to exfiltrate data or access exported/printed documents following a system reboot. However, gaining access to devices could permit some form of network access or persistence.
As explained below, we recommend disabling unneeded devices in BIOS settings to mitigate potential risks.
This issue is pending CVE assignment and fixed by this commit. It has a CVSSv3 score of 6.3; however, we consider it to be a high-severity issue, given the importance of confidentiality to our threat model.
Actions for administrators
Administrators should check to see if webcam, microphone, or additional peripherals appear in the Qubes devices menu. If so, we recommend that you open the BIOS settings for your laptop and disable any such devices where you are given the ability to do so. Instructions for doing so are specific to each laptop, and not all laptops allow such devices to be disabled from the BIOS, but we provide broad guidance in our documentation.
Additionally, administrators can perform the following actions to determine if an attack may have happened at some point in the past:
In a dom0 Terminal, run the following command:
journalctl --grep=qubes.USB
Prior to upgrading to 1.9.1, a standard USB attachment would generate two log entries:
qrexec: qubes.USBAttach+: sys-usb -> sd-devices: allowed to sd-devices
qrexec: qubes.USB+3-4: sd-devices -> sys-usb: allowed to sys-usb
However, if you see only one stand-alone log entry, it could be an instance of this vulnerability being exploited:
qrexec: qubes.USB+2-7: sd-devices -> sys-usb: allowed to sys-usb
(In this example, 3-4 and 2-7 are the IDs of the device ports.)
Please note that one stand-alone log entry does not necessarily indicate an instance of the vulnerability being exploited; there are other legitimate reasons why this might appear. If you do see an indication of a single entry, please reach out to us via your dedicated Signal group for further investigation.
Acknowledgments
Thank you to Harishwar T for reporting this through the SecureDrop bug bounty program; we’ve awarded them $2,000 for the discovery.
This release incorporates Freedom of the Press Foundation (FPF) contributions by Asra Ali; Giulio B; Martin C; Nathan Dyer, communications manager; Micah Lee; Kunal Mehta, release manager; Cory Francis Myers; Vicki Niu; Kevin O’Gorman; Francisco Rocha, deputy release manager; John Skinner; Dan Staples; and Rowen S.
Questions and comments
If you have questions or comments regarding this release, please contact us:
- Via Signal, either in your dedicated SecureDrop Support group, or by contacting the support account listed at securedrop.org/help/.
- Via securedrop@freedom.press (PGP encrypted) for sensitive security issues (please use judiciously), or submit a report via Bugcrowd.
We also encourage you to file nonsensitive issues via our GitHub repository.
Thank you for using SecureDrop!