The SecureDrop team is rotating the OpenPGP key used to sign all of our software releases. This is a routine measure to ensure that the software delivered to newsrooms using SecureDrop can only be sent as part of the official release processes by Freedom of the Press Foundation (FPF).
Rotation is a security best practice and is not in response to any security incident. The current release signing key is still in SecureDrop's control and exists only in an offline environment with trusted signers.
The previous key was generated in 2021, so after six years of service, it’s time to move on. The new key will be used to sign releases starting in early 2027.
No action is needed by SecureDrop administrators or journalists. Existing SecureDrop users will automatically be transitioned to using the new release key without the need to manually import it into SecureDrop servers or SecureDrop Workstation laptops.
Obtaining and verifying the new key
The new key can be fetched from keys.openpgp.org with the fingerprint “F252 2D58 7E20 1937 D0B2 0770 80DE 7739 C58F 1B57”. Alternatively, you can also download it from securedrop.org.
$ sq network keyserver search \ F2522D587E201937D0B2077080DE7739C58F1B57 \ --output securedrop-2027.asc Found 1 certificate related to the query: - F2522D587E201937D0B2077080DE7739C58F1B57 - SecureDrop Release Signing Key (2027) <securedrop- release-key-2027@freedom.press> (UNAUTHENTICATED) - created 2026-08-19 18:35:28 UTC - found via: hkps://keys.openpgp.org, hkps://keyserver.ubuntu.com, hkps://sks.pod01.fleetstreetops.com
$ sq inspect securedrop-2027.asc securedrop-2027.asc: OpenPGP Certificate. Fingerprint: F2522D587E201937D0B2077080DE7739C58F1B57 Public-key algo: EdDSA Public-key size: 256 bits Creation time: 2026-08-19 18:35:28 UTC Expiration time: 2031-08-19 23:39:23 UTC (creation time + 4years 11months 30days 8h 54m 19s) Key flags: certification Subkey: 0EE38DDB1E431FEE5986E0C8C1A26D1F30EEF9F3 Public-key algo: EdDSA Public-key size: 256 bits Creation time: 2026-08-19 18:35:28 UTC Expiration time: 2031-08-19 23:39:23 UTC (creation time + 4years 11months 30days 8h 54m 19s) Key flags: signing UserID: SecureDrop Release Signing Key (2027) <securedrop-release-key-2027@freedom.press> Certifications: 1, use --certifications to list
The current (2021) signing key has signed the new (2027) key as a way of demonstrating that the people who control the current key vouch for the integrity of the new key. You can verify this yourself by importing the old key and checking the certifications:
$ sq network keyserver search \ 2359E6538C0613E652955E6C188EDD3B7B22E6A3 Found 1 certificate related to the query: - 2359E6538C0613E652955E6C188EDD3B7B22E6A3 - SecureDrop Release Signing Key <securedrop-release- key-2021@freedom.press> (UNAUTHENTICATED) …
$ sq cert import securedrop-2027.asc - ┌ F2522D587E201937D0B2077080DE7739C58F1B57 └ SecureDrop Release Signing Key (2027) <securedrop- release-key-2027@freedom.press> (UNAUTHENTICATED) - imported
$ sq pki path \ 2359E6538C0613E652955E6C188EDD3B7B22E6A3 \ F2522D587E201937D0B2077080DE7739C58F1B57 \ --userid-by-email securedrop-release-key-2027@freedom.press [✓] F2522D587E201937D0B2077080DE7739C58F1B57 SecureDrop Release Signing Key (2027) <securedrop-release-key- 2027@freedom.press>: fully authenticated (100%) ◯─┬ 2359E6538C0613E652955E6C188EDD3B7B22E6A3 │ └ (SecureDrop Release Signing Key <securedrop-release- │ key-2021@freedom.press>) │ │ certified the following binding on 2026‑09‑04 │ └─┬ F2522D587E201937D0B2077080DE7739C58F1B57 └ SecureDrop Release Signing Key (2027) <securedrop- release-key-2027@freedom.press>
Next steps
To reiterate, no action is needed to begin using the new key aside from applying normal software updates.
Throughout the rest of the year, the SecureDrop team will issue updates that contain the new 2027 signing key in parallel with the current 2021 key. Next year, we will begin signing our releases with the 2027 signing key and issue updates that remove the 2021 key.
Key details
The new signing key was generated on an air-gapped Tails machine and distributed to a subset of SecureDrop Maintainers in person. We used Sequoia PGP to generate the key, with the following parameters:
export NAME="SecureDrop Release Signing Key (2027)" export EMAIL="securedrop-release-key-2027@freedom.press" sq key generate --own-key --can-sign \ --cannot-encrypt --cannot-authenticate \ --profile=rfc4880 --cipher-suite=cv25519 \ --userid "$NAME <$EMAIL>" \ --expiration 5y
A few changes from the 2021 key:
- This is an ed25519 key; previously, we used rsa4096.
- This key will expire in five years. We plan to rotate it again in four years; previously, we extended the expiry.
- This key can only be used for signing and not encryption. Previously, we had generated an encryption subkey (GPG’s default).
A note about post-quantum cryptography
OpenPGP recently gained support for post-quantum cryptography in RFC 9980. Notably, RHEL has already started using it to sign its RPMs, and recent Fedora versions support it.
However, we currently need to support Ubuntu 24.04 (Noble), Debian 13 (Trixie), and Fedora 41 (used in Qubes 4.3 dom0), and none of them are compatible with PQC algorithms.
The current priority regarding PQC is about hardening encryption to head off harvest-now, decrypt-later attacks. Given that our usage is only for signatures, we plan to wait a little longer for software support to catch up, and then we’ll switch to a PQC-enabled key.
Contact
If you have any questions, please contact us:
- Via Signal, either in your dedicated SecureDrop Support group, or by contacting the support account listed at securedrop.org/help/.
- Via securedrop@freedom.press (PGP encrypted).
Thank you for using SecureDrop!